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JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD

[EDs.]

ARREST

People v. killer, Mich., 209 N. W. 81. Irregularity of defendant's arrest no
bar to subsequent proceedings regularly instituted.
Defendant was arrested without warrant under circumstances, requiring one,
but her arrest was subsequently followed by regular warrant and complaint.
Held, defendant was rightfully held and not entitled to discharge. The court
pointed out, however, that it was not shown that evidence had been secured by
the unlawful arrest, and the decision is limited to cases where the mere arrest
was unlawful.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY

State v. Swanson, 250 Pac. 216. Assault on officer de facto.
In prosecution for assault and battery upon police officer, it was not error to
refuse to permit defendant to prove that officer was not qualified police officer,
since this was collateral issue and out of place to turn trial, upon indictment,
into quo warranto to determine title of officer to position, and for purpose of
this case it was sufficient that he was shown to be de facto officer.
BRIBERY

People v. Weitzel, Calif. D. C. A., 249 Pac. 842. Offer to receive a bribe is
not an "agreement to receive."
Conviction for bribery, under Pen. Code, Sec. 165, as amended 1905, of member of common council who allegedly offered for a consideration to vote for
purchase of water system and for annexation of another city by election, under
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1923, Act 5166, Sec. 3, cannot be sustained in absence of
agreement by party to whom offer was made to pay such consideration, where
no money was paid and indictment did not allege that defendant acted as executive or judicial officer, Pen. Code, Secs. 68, 93, being inapplicable.
BURGLARY

People v. Jones, Calif. D. C. A., 248 Pac. 713.
"inhabited dwelling house or building."

Railroad caboose not an

A railroad caboose not being an "inhabited dwelling house or building,"
within Pen. Code, Sec. 460, as amended by St. 1923, p. 747, in view of Pen.
Code, Sec. 459, and evidence not showing that defendant removing articles therefrom was armed with a deadly weapon at any time, or that he assaulted any
person, held, that conviction for first degree burglary was not sustained.
CONFESSIONS

White v. State, Texas, 287 S. W. 273. Promise of sheriff as affecting voluntary character of confession.
Where a defendant, charged with selling liquor, was told by the sheriff, "If
you will go over there and make a statement about this affair, tell the truth and
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come clean with us, I will do what I can towards getting a suspended sentence
for you," a confession then obtained was inadmissible as not being voluntarily
made.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86. Validity of Kansas Industrial Relations Act.
Court of Industrial Relations Act, Kan., Sec. 19, authorizing criminal prosecution of labor union officers for inducing others to quit employment, held not
in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to strike ordered to enforce
claim of member of union.
State v. Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., Utah, 247 Pac. 474. Validity of statute
prohibiting advertisentents of tobacco.
Laws, 1921, ch. 145, Sec. 2, as amended by Laws, 1923, ch. 52, prohibiting
publication of advertisements relating to tobacco in any form held invalid as
undue interference with interstate commerce, as applied to a cigarette advertisement published by state newspaper circulating in several states constituting
interstate commerce, since sale of cigarettes in Utah under certain restrictions is
lawful, and when shipped into state in original packages are also protected from
interference by state.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

PUNISHMENT

State e.xrel. Nelson v. Smith, Neb., 209 N. W. 328. Bread and water diet
not cruel and unusual punishent.
Relator who had been convicted of unlawful possession of intoxicating
liquor was sentenced to the county jail for sixty days, the first and last twenty
days of which were to be upon an exclusive diet of bread and water. This sentence was imposed under sec. 10169, Comp. St., 1922, which provided: "When
the imprisonment is to be without labor, the sentence may require the convict to
be fed on bread and water only, the whole or any part of the term of imprisonment." Held, that the statute did not violate the constitutional prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, and the sentence was valid.
EVIDENCE

Banett v. Commonwealth, Kent, 287 S. W. 12. Expression of opinion of
declarant in dying declaration inadmissible.
Declarant, under circumstances rendering his statements competent as dying
declarations stated that a particular person had killed him, but that "G. B. (one
of the defendants) was in the lead." Held that so much of the declaration as
related to G. B. was inadmissible as conclusion or expression of opinion.
FALSE PRETENCES

Fact that one to whom the pretences were made could have ascertainedtheir
falsity does not negative offense.
Where defendant obtained a loan by deliberately making false representations in writing as to his financial ability, held to violate Ky., St. 1213b, relative
to false pretences regardless of whether one to whom representation was made
could have ascertained falsity of such statement.

624

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

FOnMER JEOPARDY
Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 103. Double prosecution
under state and federal prohibition acts.
Under Const., U. S., Amend. 18, prosecution for same act of manufacturing
intoxicating liquor in both federal and state courts does not constitute double
jeopardy.
That accused were on bail pending trial for manufacture of liquor in federal
court presented no obstacle to their arrest for same offense under process of
state court, in absence of objection by United States thereto.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS

People v. Conti, N. Y., 216 N. Y. S.442. Jurisdiction of state to try offenses
against the National Prohibition Law in absence of state enforcement act.
The principal case raises some interesting questions about state enforcement
where there is no state enforcement act, New York having repealed the Mullen
Gage Act in 1923. Defendant was indicted by a state grand jury for the crime of
maintaining a nuisance in violation of section 1530 of the penal law of New
York. The alleged criminal act consisted of maintaining a place where liquor
containing more than one half of one per cent alcohol was sold contrary to the
provisions of the National Prohibitory Act. Held, the indictment must be dismissed. The court decided: (1) that the state courts had no jurisdiction of
offenses and crimes against the United States unless the same act had been
defined by the state legislature as a crime against the state. This, of course, is
clearly correct in view of Federal judicial code 256 vesting exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts of crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of
the United States, but there is much language in the principal case suggesting
that the same result would be arrived at in absence of such a statute, (2) that a
violation of the National Prohibition Act does not per se constitute a crime
against the state of New York, the sole power of creating crimes against the
state sovereign being in the state legislature. Nor is this changed by any provision of the 18th Amendment, which was merely designed to give to the Federal
Government a police power which it had not hitherto had, and in providing that
Congress and the several states should have concurrent power of enforcement,
the constitution neither makes the prohibited acts crimes against the state, nor
even imposes any obligation upon the state to make the acts criminal, (3) the
fact that an act was prohibited by the federal government and contrary to its
laws, did not bring it under the condemnation of sec. 1530 of the state law defining a public nuisance and prescribing the punishment therefor. The courts cites
a number of cases to the effect that neither the sale of intoxicating liquors, nor
the keeping and maintaining in an orderly manner of houses where such liquors
are sold is a nuisance at common law. One might well agree with the first two
propositions of the court, the third seems more doubtful. As pointed out in
comment on the principal case in 36 Yale Law Journal, p. 262, "it does not necessarily prevent any act from being a public nuisance because it is not specifically
defined as such in the statute.-A place where federal law is violated.is just as
likely to be the center of public disturbances as premises where a state law is
violated." While the violation of federal law may not per se constitute a nuisance, there is nevertheless under the facts of the principal case, a potential source
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of lawlessness, disorder and disturbance of the peace. Perhaps the New York
Court would say it is sufficient to consider them when they arise.
JURY

Reversal of judgment for error in overruling challenges for cause, even
though juror subsequently excused on peremptory challenge.
The trial court erroneously overruled challenges for cause of certain jurors,
who by their answers showed they had formed opinions, as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. These jurors were subsequently dismissed upon peremptory challenge, the defendant exhausting all of his peremptory challenges in the
process. Held, that "under such circumstances appellant is not required to show
that he suffered prejudice by reason of having his challenge for cause overruled
and a disqualified juror left upon his jury." Prejudice in such a case, the court
said, would and should be presumed.
LOTTERIES

State v. Dani, Wash., 250 Pac. 37.
Distribution to purchasers of admission tickets to motion picture theater on
certain night of each week of tickets on which merchandise contributed by merchants for advertising purposes was distributed by lot, held sufficient to take
case to jury on question of consideration as respects issue whether enterprise was
lottery within Rem. Comp. Sts., Sec. 2464, notwithstanding free tickets to drawing were offered to others than those purchasing theater tickets.
Parker, J., Tolman, C. J., and Mackintosh, and Askren, JJ., dissenting.
NoN-AGE

People v. Day, Calif., 248 Pac. 250. Non-age statute refers to physical not
mental age.
That defendant's "mental and moral age" was under 14 did not affect her
responsibility for crime under Pen. Code, Sec. 26, sub. 1, as statute refers to
physical age and not mental or moral age of accused.
PARDON

State v. Haxzuard, Wash., 247 Pac. 957. Effect of pardon on restoration of
civil rights.
Unconditional pardon of defendant convicted of manslaughter, purporting to
restore all rights and privileges, forfeited by reason of conviction, did not restore
license to practice art of healing, revoked because of conviction.
Unlimited pardon restores customary civil rights of citizen, but not offices
forfeited nor property or interests vested in others in consequence of conviction.
Cole v. State, Texas, 286 S. W. 204. Taking by force money obtained from
defendant by false dice not robbery.
One deprived of money by use of fraudulent dice in crap game is not guilty
of robbery in retaking money by display of firearms, for the persons first taking
it would be guilty of theft by false pretext and the title to the money thus
acquired would not pass. The retaking in such a case may, however, constitute
an assault.

